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1083 
A DELAYED SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE MAKES FOR AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE 
CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK CITY 
People v. Tashbaeva1 
(decided January 31, 2012) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The judiciary’s interpretation of the protections afforded by 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution has given 
rise to a complex and controversial area of law.  From its express 
language, it would seem that the reasonableness of a search and sei-
zure turns on whether it was executed pursuant to a warrant and sup-
ported by probable cause, as these two inquiries are used to justify an 
invasion into one’s privacy, or alternatively, interference with one’s 
security.2  Nevertheless, as an extensive analysis of case law demon-
strates that circumstances exist in which a warrantless search and sei-
zure might be found reasonable, and thus, these circumstances have 
laid the foundation for judicially-crafted exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement.3 
The central issue before the court in People v. Tashbaeva was 
one of first impression.4  Without clear precedent on the facts of the 
instant case, the plain view doctrine, the search incident to a lawful 
arrest exception, the concept of a preliminary investigation, and the 
ongoing crime scene rule guided the Criminal Court of New York in 
its adjudication.5  After explaining the relevance and analyzing the 
rationale underlying each of these distinct concepts, the court ruled 
 
1 938 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Crim. Ct. 2012). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3 W. MARK WARD, TENN. CRIM. TRIAL PRACTICE § 4:20 (2012-2013 ed.). 
4 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 879. 
5 Id. 
1
McGowan: A Delayed Search of an Automobile
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
1084 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
on the issues before it.6  The court held that “once the police have re-
linquished dominion and control over an automobile they are re-
quired to obtain a warrant in order to retrieve evidence therefrom, 
even though the evidence may have been initially seized lawfully un-
der the plain view or other recognized exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement.”7  The court explained that although a police officer need 
not complete a search at the time an initial plain view observation is 
made, a seizure that is procured by a “delayed search” is unauthor-
ized, unconstitutional, and therefore, will not stand in court.8  The 
court reasoned that the mere fact a seizure would have been legal 
when the incriminating item was first observed is not sufficient to 
justify a seizure that is unduly delayed, occurring after the prelimi-
nary investigation has been completed.9  Before arriving at this con-
clusion, the court thoroughly considered the applicable legal theories 
and cases involving similar facts, specifically, cases in which the 
warrantless search was lawfully conducted at the outset, but a delay 
in finishing the search of the crime scene gave rise to constitutional 
implications.10 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On April 12, 2011, three officers in an unmarked police vehi-
cle accompanied Officer Tabora down Richmond Avenue.11  Around 
10:00 p.m., they observed a car recklessly swerving in and out of 
lanes.12  After several efforts to pull the vehicle over, the officers fi-
nally succeeded in doing so.13  Upon approaching the defendant’s ve-
hicle, Officer Tabora observed Iryna Tashbaeva’s “physical manifes-
tations of intoxication,” suggesting that she had consumed alcohol 
and was under the influence.14  Prior to ordering the defendant to step 
out of the car, Officer Tabora made a plain view observation.15  Of-
 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 876. 
8 Id. 
9 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 879-81. 
10 Id. at 879. 
11 Id. at 876. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77 (noting that Iryna Tashbaeva, the defendant, was 
the driver of the car). 
15 Id. at 877. 
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ficer Tabora noticed a “partially filled bottle of cognac” and a 
“Sprite” bottle on the center console of the car.16  After complying 
with Officer Tabora’s orders to step out of the vehicle, the defendant 
was arrested and brought to an Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit 
(“IDTU”).17  At the time of the arrest, Officer Tabora failed to “seize 
or voucher” the bottles observed in the defendant’s vehicle.18  Anoth-
er problem was that before the defendant was transported to IDTU, 
the officers failed to arrange for the “defendant’s vehicle [to be] tak-
en into police custody,” and consequently, the vehicle remained un-
secured on the side of the road where the arrest was made.19  The next 
morning, Officer Tabora met with the Assistant District Attorney, 
and thereafter, proceeded to the defendant’s vehicle to collect the bot-
tles.20  Upon arriving at the scene of the arrest (where the car was 
left), the officer sniffed the Sprite bottle, determined it contained al-
cohol, and removed the Sprite bottle and the bottle of cognac from 
the vehicle with intent to use each item as evidence against the de-
fendant.21  Notably, the vehicle was at the site approximately eight to 
ten hours before the officer returned to seize the bottles.22 
III. RATIONALE OF THE COURT 
The court engaged in a step-by-step analysis, ultimately con-
cluding that Officer Tabora’s seizure of the two bottles was unauthor-
ized and illegal.23  Beginning with a discussion of the Fourth 
Amendment and the protections that it guarantees, the court observed 
that “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.”24  Thus, the court 
explained that the search must fall within one of the established ex-
ceptions in which the circumstances justify the search, and perhaps, 
also justify the subsequent seizure in order for the court to construe 





19 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 877. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 877-78. 
22 Id. at 877. 
23 Id. at 882. 
24 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
25 Id.; see WARD, supra note 3 (explaining all of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement, including the plain view doctrine, the search incident to a lawful arrest 
3
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nized, the plain view doctrine is one exception to the Warrant Clause 
of the Fourth Amendment, which authorizes the police to proceed 
without a warrant in circumstances where illegal contraband is ob-
served in open view.26  The court noted however, that three require-
ments must be met in order to invoke the plain view doctrine: “(1) the 
police [must be] lawfully in a position from which they [can] view an 
object; (2) the incriminating character of the object [must be] imme-
diately apparent, and (3) the officers [must] have a lawful right of ac-
cess to the object.”27 
In turn, the court first analyzed whether the immediate stop of 
the defendant was lawful.28  Due to the reckless manner in which the 
defendant was driving her car, the court found sufficient facts on the 
record to show the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defend-
ant was driving illegally.29  Thus, concluding the stop was justified 
under the circumstances, the court next had to decide whether the sei-
zure was lawful.30  Given “the officer’s warrantless retrieval of the 
incriminating items from the defendant’s vehicle,” the court turned to 
the plain view doctrine to determine whether it was applicable so as 
to prevent suppression of the evidence.31  Although only reasonable 
suspicion is required to stop a vehicle, probable cause that the evi-
dence is linked to criminal activity is necessary to preserve seized ev-
idence under the plain view doctrine.32 
At the outset, the court noted that if both bottles were seized 
at the time of or within close proximity to the time of arrest, the sei-
zure would have undoubtedly been lawful under the plain view doc-
trine.33  That is, if the officer retrieved the two bottles from the vehi-
cle within close proximity to the arrest, as opposed to allowing for an 
eight to ten hour delay, the seizure would have been lawful under 
well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent.34  The precedent 
 
exception, a valid consent based search, and so on). 
26 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
27 Id. (citations omitted). 
28 Id. at 877. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876, 877. 
32 Id. at 877. 
33 Id. at 879. 
34 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (noting that each of these cases continued to build 
upon, clarify, and reaffirm the circumstances under which the search incident to arrest ex-
ception is applicable so as to justify a warrantless search and fruits seized therefrom). 
4
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to which the court referenced was initially set forth in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia.35  In Chimel, the Supreme Court held “that a search incident 
to arrest is valid when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment . . . .”36  The Court in Chimel 
limited the scope of the area that was searchable to only that which is 
within reaching distance of the passenger.37  In doing so, the Court 
relied in part on how reasonableness in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment has been interpreted, considering “the history and expe-
rience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the 
evils to which it was a response.”38  Thus, the Court explained that 
the search incident to arrest exception is limited in its scope, conclud-
ing that “[t]he search here went far beyond the petitioner’s person 
and the area from within which he might have obtained either a 
weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against 
him[,]” and therefore, “[t]here was no constitutional justification” to 
authorize the warrantless search.39 
At first glance, “[t]his rule [appeared to] ‘. . . be stated clearly 
enough,’ but in the early going after Chimel it proved difficult to ap-
ply, particularly in cases that involved searches ‘inside [of] automo-
bile[s] after the arrestees [we]re no longer in [them].’ ”40  For this 
reason, the court in Tashbaeva also looked to New York v. Belton41 to 
determine whether the search and seizure at issue in the instant case, 
occurring in a vehicle absent the defendant, could be upheld by fall-
ing within this “well delineated exception[].”42 
In Belton, the Supreme Court assessed the lawfulness of po-
lice actions, beginning with a routine traffic stop of the defendant for 
 
35 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (not-
ing that the rule set forth by the Court in Chimel was later qualified and clarified by the 
Court in Belton, and then again, by the Court in Gant, and the abrogation of the Court’s rul-
ing in Chimel occurred because the search had occurred years prior to, and the appeal was 
merely pending, when the decision in Gant was made).  In Davis, the Court held that 
“[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent 
is not subject to the exclusionary rule.”  Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429. 
36 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
37 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768. 
38 Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
39 Id. at 768 
40 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 458-59) (alterations in original). 
41 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
42 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
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speeding.43  At the time of the stop, the officer observed an envelope 
in the vehicle with language written on it referencing marijuana.44  
The lower court found this observation coupled with the smell of ma-
rijuana enough to give the officer probable cause to arrest the occu-
pants of the car.45  However, the lower court concluded, searching the 
car’s backseat and seizing cocaine from the car was unreasonable.46  
Reversing the lower court’s ruling on appeal,47 the Supreme Court es-
tablished that when a police officer makes a lawful arrest of “the oc-
cupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of 
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”48 
Nevertheless, the proper application of the aforementioned 
exception remained disputed, as some “courts read the decision to au-
thorize automobile searches incident to arrests of recent occupants, 
regardless of whether the arrestee . . . was in reaching distance of the 
vehicle,” while other courts rejected that interpretation of the prece-
dent set forth in Belton.49  Therefore, the court in Tashbaeva referred 
to one final Supreme Court decision, Arizona v. Gant,50 explaining 
why the search incident to arrest was not applicable under the facts of 
the instant case. 
In Gant, the police relied on an anonymous tip to investigate 
drug sales allegedly occurring in a home.51  The police knocked on 
the door of the suspected residence and asked to speak to the owner.52  
The defendant, Gant, opened the door and explained to the officers 
that he expected the owner to return home later that day.53  After 
leaving the residence, an investigative records check revealed that 
Gant had been driving with a suspended license.54  Later that evening, 
the police returned to the home and arrested two people.55  After se-
 
43 Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 456. 
47 Id. 
48 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted). 
49 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424. 
50 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (explaining that the precedent set forth in Belton was to be limited 
and that the search incident to arrest doctrine only applies to certain circumstances regarding 
the vehicle context). 
51 Id. at 335. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 335-36. 
54 Id. at 336. 
55 Gant, 556 U.S. at 336. 
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curing the arrestees in different police cars, Gant arrived at the resi-
dence and was arrested for driving with a suspended license.56  After 
arresting Gant, the police proceeded to search his vehicle, discover-
ing and seizing one gun and one bag of cocaine found inside the 
pocket of Gant’s jacket, which was retrieved from the backseat of the 
car.57 
When the search and seizure was subsequently challenged in 
court, the Supreme Court found the search incident to arrest excep-
tion inapplicable under these facts.58  The Court explained that be-
cause Gant was arrested at his place of residence and not while oper-
ating a vehicle, the “police could not reasonably have believed” that 
Gant could have accessed the car, or reasonably suspected that evi-
dence of the offense would be found in the car.59  The Supreme Court 
concluded that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent oc-
cupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to 
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”60 
Next, the court in Tashbaeva considered how the interval of 
time that the car was not in police custody affected the lawfulness of 
the search and seizure.61  As there was no New York precedent on 
this specific question, the court looked to cases where an initial war-
rantless search was conducted lawfully, but the search was delayed.62  
The court in Tashbaeva summarily dismissed “[t]he concept of an un-
limited ongoing crime scene [rule] to the warrant requirement [be-
cause it] has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court.”63 
Thereafter, the court turned to the concept of a preliminary 
investigation,64 looking to an in-depth analysis provided by the Su-
preme Court, Second Department of the Appellate Division, in Peo-




58 Id. at 344. 
59 Id. (explaining that the two justifications for a search incident to arrest are safety con-
cerns in protecting the officer when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the compart-
ment, and when an officer reasonably believes there is a likelihood of finding evidence in the 
car that is relevant to the offense). 
60 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). 
61 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 879. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 879-80. 
65 450 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1982). 
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from those ruled upon in Mincey v. Arizona66 wherein the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the lawfulness of “an exhaustive and 
intrusive [warrantless] search” executed over the course of a four-day 
period,67 emphasizing the Supreme Court’s reliance on the fact the 
search was made “for the purpose of finding and seizing evidence to 
support a prosecution.”68  Nevertheless, the court in Cohen was nei-
ther persuaded that the death at the premises, nor allegations of mur-
der was sufficient to give the police legal justification for returning to 
the unsecured premises and conducting a subsequent warrantless 
search.69 
In Cohen, the police received a phone call that a shooting oc-
curred at the condominium apartment owned by the Cohen’s.70  Upon 
the first responding officer’s arrival at the apartment, the officer en-
countered the defendant, Patricia Cohen.71  She led the officer into a 
bedroom of the apartment where the victim, Doctor Cohen, laid 
bleeding from a “gunshot wound to [his] head.”72  The police found 
an automatic pistol by Doctor Cohen’s side.73  The defendant claimed 
that Doctor Cohen had shot himself while they were sleeping.74  
While removing and preparing to transport Doctor Cohen to the hos-
pital, the police seized several items including the gun that was found 
next to Doctor Cohen, live ammunition, a shell casing, and two 
notes.75  The police left the apartment several hours later without 
locking the door.76  Yet, after what seemed a haphazard attempt to 
secure the scene, the police did “arrange to have officers on patrol in 
the area to keep an eye on the apartment . . . .”77 
The following day, the Medical Examiner found evidence to 
suggest that the incident might have been a homicide, as opposed to a 
suicide.78  Subsequent to receiving this information, the officers re-
 
66 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
67 Id. at 389-90. 
68 Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 500 (quoting People v. Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d 776, 778 (1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
69 Id. at 501. 
70 Id. at 498. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 





78 Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 498. 
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turned to the apartment and conducted a “top to bottom” search and 
seized several more items.79  The police did not obtain a warrant or 
even make any effort to do so.80  In turn, the court suppressed the ev-
idence the police retrieved from the apartment.81  In making its rul-
ing, the court first turned to Mincey, agreeing with the court’s ra-
tionale: 
We do not question the right of the police to respond 
to emergency situations.  Numerous state and federal 
cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
does not bar police officers from making warrantless 
entries and searches when they reasonably believe that 
a person within is in need of immediate aid.  Similarly, 
when the police come upon the scene of a homicide 
they may make a prompt warrantless search of the ar-
ea to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still 
on the premises. . . . And the police may seize any ev-
idence that is in plain view during the course of their 
legitimate emergency activities.82 
Accordingly, the court in Cohen observed that “when a constitution-
ally protected area becomes the scene of a crime, the police may sub-
ject the premises to a preliminary search and inspection whose scope 
and duration must be limited by and reasonably related to the exigen-
cies of the situation.”83  Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court likewise 
concluded in Mincey, the court in Cohen found that “[o]nce that pre-
liminary investigation has come to an end . . . no further searches for 
evidence may be conducted on the premises unless authorized by a 
warrant.”84 
The court in Cohen explained that while police are authorized 
to conduct a preliminary investigation on the premises of a crime 
scene, this initial investigation is “limited by and [must be] reasona-
bly related to the exigencies of the situation.”85  The court further 
acknowledged that the lack of an ongoing police presence after the 
officers initially left the scene was a significant factor in its determi-
 
79 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 499. 
82 Id. at 500 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93) (citations omitted). 
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nation because the crime scene was left unattended and not protected 
from undue interference.86  Thus, the court in Cohen held that it was 
unlawful for the police to have left the crime scene, leaving it un-
guarded for several hours, and then returning to the scene without a 
search warrant and collecting incriminating evidence.87 
Accepting the reasoning set forth in Cohen, but seeking fur-
ther guidance on the impact of and precedent governing an ongoing 
crime scene and a preliminary investigation, the court in Tashbaeva 
then turned to People v. Neulist88 for guidance.89  In Neulist, the po-
lice responded to the scene of an alleged accident and the preliminary 
investigation revealed that the victim died as a result of an aneurysm; 
however, several hours later, an autopsy revealed a bullet, which led 
the police to believe that a homicide occurred.90  While the initial re-
sponding officers did not remain present at the crime scene, another 
officer safeguarded it.91 
Relying heavily on the ongoing police presence at the crime 
scene, the court concluded that the subsequent search and seizure was 
lawful, and therefore the evidence seized from the scene was admis-
sible against the defendant.92  The court explained, “Although the ini-
tial police intrusion was for the purpose of investigating the scene 
and the cause of a death, the subsequent search, once criminality had 
been established, was but an extension or continuation of the initial 
investigation.”93  In arriving at this conclusion, the court rejected “the 
line drawn by the County Court in scale or scope between the initial 
investigation of the decedent’s death and the subsequent search of the 
premises . . . .”94  Instead, the court in Neulist looked to “the broad 
and indisputably necessary and proper authority granted to a medical 
examiner” whose duty it is to review the evidence and draw conclu-
sions based upon it, and thus, was persuaded that the police acted 
within their authority to return to the scene and conduct a subsequent 
 
86 Id. (noting that the officers’ patrol outside of the apartment building did not suffice to 
safeguard the crime scene). 
87 Id. 
88 350 N.Y.S.2d 178 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1973). 
89 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 880. 
90 Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 181. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 183. 
93 Id. (footnote omitted). 
94 Id. 
10
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search.95  While at first glance, the facts in Neulist seem to resemble 
those in Cohen, in which the court arrived at the opposite conclusion, 
pertinent to the court’s decision was “[t]he posting of a police guard 
at the bedroom door [which] served not only to prevent the destruc-
tion or removal of any potential evidence but also to establish a con-
tinued and legally proper police presence on the scene.”96 
In turn, giving weight to the lack of an ongoing police pres-
ence at the scene in the instant case, the court in Tashbaeva finally 
turned to People v. Dancey,97 distinguishing the facts relied upon in 
Dancey from those before it.98  Specifically, although the motion to 
suppress pertained to evidence seized in a subsequent warrantless en-
try and exploration of a crime scene whereby “the investigating de-
tective went to the apartment . . . already occupied by a police 
guard,” the court’s ruling in Dancey was less reliant upon the ongo-
ing police presence or the continuum of a preliminary investigation; 
instead, the court found the evidence was not seized by a search since 
the evidence “was [discovered] in plain view.”99 
In Dancey, the defendant told the police that her baby was 
locked inside her apartment and was in a plastic bag.100  The police 
found the baby in a closet “apparently deceased” and despite 
“rush[ing] the baby to the hospital,” the attending doctor was unable 
to save its life.101  Thereafter, upon taking the defendant to the local 
precinct where she was subjected to routine questioning about the in-
cident, the defendant confessed that she had attempted to kill the 
child.102  During the interval of time between when the baby was ini-
tially brought to the hospital and the defendant was brought to the 
precinct, an officer guarded the crime scene at the apartment.103  At 
trial, it was attested that “[a]s a crime scene, the police believed it 
was necessary [for an officer to stand guard] to prevent any possible 
intrusion into, or disruption of, the apartment which might result in 
the loss of relevant evidence.”104 
 
95 Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 183. 
96 Id. 
97 443 N.Y.S.2d 776 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1981). 
98 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 880. 
99 Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78. 
100 Id. at 777. 
101 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 777. 
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After the defendant confessed, a detective returned to the 
apartment, allegedly “to better view the physical layout of the place 
in order to better understand the statements that [had been] given to 
him.”105  When the purported search was later challenged at trial, the 
investigating detective contended that “[h]is purpose [in returning to 
and entering the apartment] was [neither] to search the premises, nor 
to gather evidence.”106  Arguably, as such purpose was in part, the 
basis in Mincey for the Supreme Court rejecting the constitutionality 
of the subsequent search challenged therein, such contention was 
made strategically to avoid suppression.107 
Nevertheless, while the detective was inside of the apartment, 
he observed a note in plain view that contained information incrimi-
nating the defendant, and thus, the note was seized.108  Thereafter, 
when back at the precinct, the detective asked the defendant if she 
wrote the note that he retrieved from the apartment and “[s]he 
acknowledged that she had.”109  Thus, upon review, a dual inquiry 
was required in order for the court to determine whether the note was 
admissible.110  First, the court in Dancey had to determine whether a 
search had occurred, and second, if it had, whether the fruits seized 
without a warrant were admissible, falling within one of the recog-
nized exceptions to the warrant clause.111  At the outset, it is notewor-
thy that the court considered both Neulist and Mincey, observing that 
the police presence justified the search under Neulist and the facts be-
fore it differed from those in Mincey because unlike in Mincey the de-
tective was not “there for the purpose of finding and seizing evidence 
to support a prosecution.”112  However, it was neither the police pres-
ence nor the intent of the investigating detective that justified its rul-
 
105 Id. at 777-78. 
106 Id. at 777. 
107 Compare Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395 (holding that “the warrantless search of [the defend-
ant’s] apartment [for the purpose of gathering evidence to substantiate the crime suspected] 
was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide has recently occurred 
there”), with Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78 (noting that the detective alleged and the court 
accepted that “[t]he detective was not there to search the premises, nor to gather evidence,” 
but that he nevertheless returned to the scene, entered the apartment, and seized evidence 
that helped him to understand the defendant’s incriminating statements). 
108 Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 778. 
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ing.113  Rather, the court in Dancey concluded that the detective’s 
subsequent “entrance into the apartment constituted no more of an in-
trusion into defendant’s privacy than did the legitimate presence of 
the police guard” at the premises.114  Moreover, the court found that 
the note discovered therein was not seized “pursuant to a search” be-
cause “[i]t was in plain view.”115  Therefore, construing “the police 
presence in the apartment []as a legitimate response to the exigent 
need to safeguard the crime scene,” the court in Dancey determined 
that “the detective’s appearance [at the scene] and activities [therein] 
did not exceed the ambit of that presence, [and thus] the detective had 
the right to seize evidence in plain view.”116 
IV. THE HOLDING IN TASHBAEVA 
After carefully reviewing each of the relevant doctrines and 
the applicable precedent, as set forth above, the court in Tashbaeva 
explained:  
[While m]indful of the automobile exception, which 
often allows the warrantless seizure of an automobile 
itself due to its inherent mobility, and that the incrimi-
nating evidence in the instant case was observed in 
plain view during the preliminary investigation . . . the 
officer’s previous plain view observation of the bottles 
did not provide the predicate for a warrantless seizure 
on the following day.117   
In addition, the court took note that “there was no impediment to Of-
ficer Tabora’s ability to obtain a warrant since [in fact] he had been 
to the District Attorney’s office and met with an Assistant District 
Attorney [to discuss the case] before returning to [the crime scene] to 
secure the evidence.”118  Therefore, the court concluded that “[o]nce 
there is an interruption in their control and custody of a crime scene 
the police are required to obtain a warrant in order to retrieve any ev-
idence therefrom[,]” and thus, the seizure of the two bottles was un-
 
113 Dancey, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 778. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)). 
117 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 881. 
118 Id. at 881-82. 
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lawful.119 
This holding was consistent with both federal and state prece-
dent, as the court justified its ruling based upon three pertinent obser-
vations supported by the case law it explored.120  First, the court con-
sidered “the fact that the vehicle remained unsecured by a police 
presence during the entire interval between defendant’s arrest and the 
seizure . . . .”121  Second, the court recognized “the [unnecessary and 
unwarranted] lapse of time between the plain view observations and 
the seizure of the bottles . . . .”122  Finally, the court observed that the 
seizure was made in “the absence of any exigent circumstances,” as 
the prosecution put forth no facts to suggest that the circumstances 
surrounding the defendant’s arrest and/or Officer Tabora’s prelimi-
nary investigation impeded his ability to seize the evidence observed 
in plain view.123  In fact, the notion of immediacy tending to support 
a finding of exigent circumstances, such as a threat to the preserva-
tion of evidence, was not served by, but rather, put at risk by Officer 
Tabora’s “delayed retrieval of evidence.”124  Accordingly, directing 
that “a warrantless seizure may not . . . be predicated upon an earlier 
plain view observation of the subject evidence[,]” the court in 
Tashbaeva upheld the defendant’s right to privacy and security in the 
contents of his vehicle, as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.125 
This Note will explore the federal and New York State prece-
dent regarding each of the renowned exceptions to the warrant clause, 
including exigent circumstances, the plain view doctrine, and the 
search incident to a lawful arrest, as well as consider the scope and 
duration of a preliminary investigation and ongoing crime scene rule, 
which rule has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court, but 
nevertheless, relied upon by New York State courts in limited cir-
cumstances.  While the federal and state approaches are similar, these 
doctrines are neither applied nor interpreted precisely the same in 
state and federal court.  All of these doctrines, when viewed in the 
aggregate, assisted the court in Tashbaeva in making its ruling.  Thus, 
in order to understand the constitutional implications of the subse-
 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 881. 
121 Id. 
122 Tashbaeva, 938 N.Y.S.2d at 881. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 876. 
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quent search and seizure that was at issue in Tashbaeva, it is impera-
tive to analyze each of these concepts independently. 
V. FEDERAL PRECEDENT 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
tects 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants, shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.126 
The Fourth Amendment exists for the purpose of protecting the 
American citizenry from “unreasonable searches and seizures” con-
ducted by officers acting in their official capacity.127  As a general 
rule, government officials need both probable cause and a warrant in 
order to conduct a valid search under the Fourth Amendment.128 
Since the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision 
in Katz v. United States,129 the Court has endeavored to carefully lim-
it the types and the scope of searches and seizures that will be found 
reasonable without a warrant.  In Katz, the defendant was suspected 
of transferring illegal gambling and wagering information in violation 
of a federal statute.130  Thus, in order to confirm or dismiss these sus-
picions, FBI agents attached an electronic surveillance device to the 
outside of a telephone booth in which the defendant used regularly.131  
In doing so, the FBI agents were able to listen to and record all of the 
conversations of the defendant occurring within the telephone 
booth.132  When the defendant challenged the police action, seeking 
to suppress the evidence obtained as a result, the Supreme Court ob-
served that the police unconstitutionally obtained information by tap-
 
126 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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ping a public phone booth.133 
While the Court explained that “the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places,” the Court further emphasized that the place 
in which a person occupies does in fact affect the degree and/or ex-
pectation of privacy that a person shall possess.134  Moreover, the 
Court observed that as a general rule “[w]hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”135  Nevertheless, looking to the facts 
in the instant case whereby the defendant was viewable by the public 
from within the booth, but purposefully made entry and closed the 
door behind him, the Court concluded that “what [an individual] 
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”136  In turn, the precedent set forth 
by the Court in Katz set the stage for search and seizure jurispru-
dence.137 
A. Exigent Circumstances and the Plain View 
Doctrine 
The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio138 narrowly interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment, providing the police with more leeway in 
conducting searches and seizures.139  In doing so, the Court in Terry 
did not discount the deep-rooted history of the Fourth Amendment, 
but cognizant to the fact that societal changes have an inevitable ef-
fect on the enforcement of the law, the Court recognized that circum-
stances exist in which it impracticable for the police to secure a war-
rant.140  As a result, the Court established an “exigent circumstances” 
exception under which a search and seizure in the absence of proba-
ble cause or a warrant may be found lawful.141  The Court reasoned 
 
133 Id. at 359. 
134 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (observing the move from protecting property rights to protecting privacy rights, as 
exemplified by the famous quote, “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”). 
137 See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443 (observing the scope and limitations of the plain view 
doctrine); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that probable cause is 
required to seize an item in plain view); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 385 (holding that a prompt war-
rantless search can be made for the purpose of protection).  
138 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
139 Id. at 30. 
140 Id. at 20. 
141 Id. 
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that there are certain times where the immediacy of a situation re-
quires that an officer conduct a search of a person, recognizing that 
the immediate safety of the officer in his or her investigation is one 
justification.142  However, the Supreme Court attempted to refrain 
from creating a broad exception to the warrant clause, explaining that 
in order to invoke the exigent circumstances exception, an officer 
must have reasonable suspicion before proceeding with the search of 
a person when less then probable cause is present, or no warrant has 
been obtained.143 
The Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire
144
 explored a num-
ber of exceptions to the warrant requirement.145  In Coolidge, the de-
fendant was arrested after an investigation ensued regarding the mur-
der of a young fourteen-year-old girl.146  The police spoke with the 
defendant at his home subsequent to the murder, and the defendant, 
upon request, produced three guns he owned.147  He also agreed to 
submit to a lie detector test regarding his whereabouts on the night of 
the murder to be held later that week.148  On the day of the test, two 
plain-clothed officers went to the defendant’s home and spoke with 
his wife, who eventually produced four guns and clothes that might 
have linked the defendant to the murder.149  After obtaining this evi-
dence, the police continued their investigation until a hearing be-
tween the police and the State Attorney General was held in order for 
the police to get an arrest and search warrant.150  Upon arrest later 
that day, pursuant to a search warrant for the vehicles, the police im-
pounded the vehicles and on several occasions performed a sweep of 
them for evidence.151  The Court agreed that the warrant was invalid, 
and therefore, observed that the search and seizure of the vehicles 
would not be upheld unless an exception was found to be applica-
ble.152 
The Government argued several exceptions applied, including 
 
142 Id. at 27. 
143 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
144 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 445-46. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 446. 
149 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 446. 
150 Id. at 446-47. 
151 Id. at 447. 
152 Id. at 449, 453. 
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the search incident to arrest exception and the plain view doctrine.153  
The law has long recognized “that under certain circumstances the 
police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.”154  Thus, 
the State proposed that because the car seized was in plain view, both 
the warrantless seizure and subsequent search at the police station did 
not undermine the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.155  
However, the Supreme Court explained that two requirements must 
be met for a plain view observation to be reasonable.156  First, the 
Court expressed “that plain view alone is never enough to justify the 
warrantless seizure of evidence.”157  Second, the Court reiterated the 
inadvertence requirement, meaning that the item seized cannot be the 
focus of the search, or anticipated before the search commences.158  
Hence, the Court explained that the police may only rely upon the 
plain view exception when the items were observed incidentally as a 
result of a justified search.159  The Court directed that this exception 
is not intended to justify a search on its own with nothing more, and 
“no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or sei-
zure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’ ”160  Therefore, the seizure of the 
car in this particular case was unlawful because the officers could 
have and should have obtained a valid warrant.161 
In Horton v. California,162 the Court looked at the second lim-
itation set forth in Coolidge, one of inadvertence, determining that 
this limitation to a plain view observation was not necessary to make 
a lawful seizure of an item, so long as the other conditions are satis-
fied.163  In Horton, an officer acted upon probable cause to search the 
defendant’s home for the proceeds of a robbery and any weapons that 
might have been used during the crime.164  The search warrant that 
was granted did not enumerate any weapons, but did specifically au-
 
153 Id. at 453-55, 464. 
154 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465. 
155 Id. at 464. 
156 Id. at 468. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 469-70. 
159 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-70. 
160 Id. at 468. 
161 Id. at 472-73. 
162 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
163 Id. at 130. 
164 Id. at 130-31. 
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thorize police to search for the proceeds from the robbery.165  During 
the search, the police found several guns in plain view and seized 
them.166  The defendant argued that the discovery of the weapons was 
not inadvertent because although the search warrant failed to enu-
merate weapons, a supporting affidavit from the police officer men-
tioned them.167  In turn, the Court concluded inadvertence is not a 
necessary condition to a plain view observation and subsequent sei-
zure.168 
The Court in Horton also refined the precedent of the plain 
view doctrine.169  In addition to the limitation set forth by Coolidge 
“that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless sei-
zure of evidence[,]”170 the Court in Horton set forth three conditions 
that must be met in order to invoke the doctrine.171  First, the officer 
must have lawfully arrived at the place where the evidence was plain-
ly viewed.172  Second, it is not enough that the item is in plain view, 
but  “its incriminating character must also be ‘immediately  appar-
ent.’ ”173  Third, the officer must “have a lawful right of access to the 
object itself.”174 
In Arizona v. Hicks,
175
 a man was injured in his apartment 
when a bullet was fired through the floor and hit him.176  The police 
entered the respondent’s apartment where they found and seized three 
weapons.177  While in the apartment, Officer Nelson observed stereo 
components that seemed expensive and looked displaced.178  He sus-
pected that it may have been stolen, so he moved the items to view 
the serial numbers, and then proceeded to write the information 
down.179  After tracing the serial numbers, the police discovered they 
 
165 Id. at 131. 
166 Id. 
167 Horton, 496 U.S. at 131. 
168 Id. at 136-37. 
169 Id. at 136. 
170 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468. 
171 Horton, 496 U.S. at 136. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (quoting Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326-27). 
174 Id. at 137. 
175 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
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were linked to an armed robbery.180  The Supreme Court in Hicks fur-
ther clarified the scope of the plain view doctrine, explaining “proba-
ble cause is required” to seize an item.181  The court explained that 
although seizing an item requires probable cause, “the search of ob-
jects in plain view that occurred here could be sustained on lesser 
grounds.”182  The State conceded that Officer Nelson only had rea-
sonable suspicion, even though the court said that moving the com-
ponents would have been a valid plain view observation under these 
circumstances.183  Although the search could have been found proper 
on lesser grounds, the seizure nonetheless required probable cause.184  
Due to the State’s concession that the officer only had reasonable 
suspicion, the Court ruled that the seizure was unlawful.185  The 
Court decided this because it wanted to maintain that police officers 
can seize objects in plain view, but at the same time, it wanted to af-
ford protections against arbitrary seizures.  The Court therefore re-
quired probable cause to seize the item in plain view, a higher stand-
ard than the reasonable suspicion the officer conceded. 
B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception 
In addition to the plain view exception, another controversial 
and complex area is the search incident to an arrest exception.186  The 
seminal case in this area is Chimel v. California.187  In Chimel, police 
officers arrived at the defendant’s home with a valid arrest warrant 
due to their belief that he was connected to a recent burglary of a coin 
shop.188  The defendant’s wife gave the police permission to enter 
their home.189  However, the defendant was not home at the time.190  
The police waited approximately ten to fifteen minutes for the de-
 
180 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 3263. 
181 Id. at 326. 
182 Id. at 327-28 (observing that unlike a seizure which now requires probable cause, the 
search leading up the a potential seizure could be upheld in the future on lesser grounds then 
probable cause). 
183 Id. at 326. 
184 Id. at 327-28. 
185 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 327-28. 
186 WARD, supra note 3. 
187 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752. 
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fendant to return, at which time they made the arrest.191  The police 
then requested permission to search and the defendant expressly re-
fused.192  The police, without a search warrant, searched the home re-
gardless of the lack of consent, and seized several incriminating 
items.193  The Court identified two significant instances that might 
justify a search incident to arrest.194  First, a warrantless search may 
be upheld if necessary for the protection of the police officer or oth-
ers nearby.195  Moreover, the search might be found lawful if neces-
sary to safeguard evidence that could be destroyed.196  The Court held 
that “[t]here is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the ar-
restee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might 
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”197 
The Court expanded and clarified the precedent set forth in 
Chimel in Belton, addressing the issue of how a search incident to ar-
rest applies in the automobile context.198  In Belton, a state trooper 
pulled over a vehicle that contained four people.199  The trooper de-
termined that neither the passengers nor the driver owned the car or 
were even related to the owner of the car.200  The trooper sensed the 
smell of marijuana and saw an item in the car that was commonly 
linked to drugs.201  He removed the occupants from the car, placed 
each under arrest, and patted them down.202  The trooper then split 
them apart far enough so that they physically could not reach the oth-
er.203  Thereafter, the trooper entered the vehicle in order to search the 
passenger compartment and open the pocket of a jacket on the back 
seat, at which time the trooper discovered cocaine.204  When the 
search and seizure was challenged as unconstitutional at trial, the 
Court observed that as an incident to an arrest, an officer may search 
 
191 Id. 
192 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 763. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
198 Belton, 453 U.S. at 454. 
199 Id. at 455. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 455-56. 
202 Id. at 456. 
203 Belton, 453 U.S. at 456. 
204 Id. 
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the passenger compartment of a vehicle and all of the containers in 
the vehicle, even if the arrestee could not gain access to the vehicle 
during the time of the search.205  The Court concluded, consistent 
with the precedent in Chimel, that the jacket was within the immedi-
ate control of the arrestee, and therefore, the search and seizure was 
lawful and reasonable under the circumstances.206 
However, as a result of the varying applications of the rule as 
set forth by the Court in Belton, the Supreme Court in Gant granted 
certiorari, and in turn, limited the scope of the search incident to ar-
rest exception.207  In Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving 
with a suspended licensed.208  After being handcuffed and locked in a 
patrol car, the police searched the defendant’s car and found cocaine 
in the pocket of a jacket.209  The Court held that “[p]olice may search 
a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence 
of the offense of arrest.”210  The Court further explained that this rule 
exists for police safety and the preservation of evidence, without 
which the “search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless 
police obtain a warrant or . . . another exception to the warrant re-
quirement applies.”211 
C. Preliminary Investigation Concept 
In Flippo v. West Virginia,212 the Court addressed an issue 
with regard to preliminary investigation.  In Flippo, the petitioner 
called the police, informing them that he and his wife were at-
tacked.213  When the police arrived, they found the petitioner severely 
injured.214  The petitioner’s wife was discovered dead with head 
wounds.215  Without a warrant, for the following sixteen hours, the 
 
205 Id. at 457. 
206 Id. at 462-63. 
207 Gant, 556 U.S. at 347. 
208 Id. at 335. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 351. 
211 Id. 
212 528 U.S. 11, 14 (1999). 




Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/9
2013] A DELAYED SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE 1105 
police searched for, photographed, and seized evidence in the cabin 
in which the body was found.216  Thereafter, the petitioner sought to 
suppress the evidence retrieved from the cabin, “argu[ing] that the 
police had obtained no warrant, and that no exception to the warrant 
requirement justified the search and seizure.”217  The Court rejected 
to observe the purported “ ‘crime scene exception’ to the warrant re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment.”218  The Court further ex-
plained that the police could not justify a warrantless search of the 
cabin based solely on the fact that a crime occurred in that area.219  
The Court held that the “police may make warrantless entries onto 
premises if they reasonably believe a person is in need of immediate 
aid and may make prompt warrantless searches of a homicide scene 
for possible other victims or a killer on the premises.”220 
In Mincey, a narcotics raid resulted in the death of an officer 
at the defendant’s home.221  The narcotics agents raided the house, 
secured the scene, and performed a brief search in an effort to look 
for other individuals.222  Thereafter, homicide agents arrived and 
commenced a four-day long search.223  The Court explained that of-
ficers may only “make a prompt warrantless search of the area” for 
their protection and the protection of possible victims or civilians in 
that house.224  The Court further recognized that a four-day warrant-
less search of the home was entirely unreasonable.225  The Court not-
ed that the search conducted was not prompt and overly exhaus-
tive.226  Thus, the evidence seized from the scene was suppressed.227 
VI. NEW YORK STATE PRECEDENT 
“[A]lthough the history and identical language of the State 
and Federal constitutional privacy guarantees . . . generally support a 
 
216 Id. 
217 Flippo, 528 U.S. at 12. 
218 Id. at 13. 
219 Id. at 14. 
220 Id. 
221 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 387. 
222 Id. at 388. 
223 Id. at 388-89. 
224 Id. at 392. 
225 Id. at 393. 
226 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389. 
227 Id. 389-90. 
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‘policy of uniformity,’ [the New York Court of Appeals] has demon-
strated its willingness to adopt more protective standards under the 
State Constitution.”228  As the New York Court of Appeals has ob-
served, “It is fundamental that warrantless searches and seizures are 
per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the acknowledged 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”229 
A. The Plain View Doctrine 
New York State Courts have recognized several exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.  One of the most controversial, complex, 
and comprehensive exceptions is the plain view doctrine.  In order to 
invoke the plain view doctrine as an exception justifying a warrant-
less seizure, three requirements must be met: “(1) the police [must 
be] lawfully in the position from which the object is viewed; (2) the 
police [must] have lawful access to the object; and (3) the object’s in-
criminating nature [must be] immediately apparent.”230 
In People v. Spinelli,231 two trucks were reported as hi-
jacked.232  The trucks were later found in the rear of the defendant’s 
place of business through a confidential informant.233  An officer 
from a public spot observed the two trucks and determined that they 
were the stolen vehicles.234  The police then arrested the defendant on 
unrelated charges.235  After the arrest, they verified the vehicles were 
stolen, proceeded to the back of the business without a search war-
rant, and searched the cars for information.236  The court in Spinelli 
adopted the following rule from the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Coolidge.237  The court reiterated two caveats to the plain 
view doctrine including: (1) a plain view observation is never suffi-
 
228 People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted). 
229 People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. 1993), abrogated by Minnesota v. Dicker-
son, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (relying on the same reasoning set forth by the Court in Katz, 389 
U.S. 347). 
230 Id. at 301 (citations omitted). 
231 315 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1974). 




236 Spinelli, 315 N.E.2d at 793. 
237 Id. at 794 (stating that when a law enforcement official observes an item in plain view, 
it does not follow that the officer can conduct a warrantless search and seizure without any 
restrictions). 
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cient by itself to “justify a warrantless search and seizure,” and (2) a 
plain view observation must be inadvertent, and in no way anticipat-
ed.238  The court further held that “it makes no difference if the article 
seized is ‘mere evidence,’ contraband or evidence of the crime or 
fruits of the crime.”239 
In People v. Wasserman,240 the defendant was charged with 
the murder of his wife.241  He reported her missing to the police and 
her body was ultimately found behind the defendant’s place of busi-
ness.242  During a lawful search of his apartment, a detective who 
specialized in serology and blood-related evidence found five pieces 
of evidence allegedly in plain view, seizing them for further inspec-
tion.243  The court found that four of the five seized items were ad-
missible, and that the fifth was inadmissible because it was not in 
plain view.244  The court in Wasserman, as a result, did away with the 
inadvertence condition, which meant that the object seized could not 
have been the item being specifically searched for.245  The court ob-
served that “the element of inadvertence, required when Spinelli was 
decided, is no longer necessary in New York to seize evidence pursu-
ant to the plain view exception.”246 
In People v. Brown,247 the defendant allegedly stole a trac-
tor.248  He requested the help of a friend in switching the vehicle iden-
tification numbers with another tractor, but that friend refused to par-
ticipate.249  The friend reported the defendant’s plan to the police, and 
the police ultimately obtained a search warrant for “the stolen trac-
tor’s ignition key, the missing VIN plate, [a] steel chain, the top link 
bar” and anything else that may be considered contraband.250  While 
searching for the items, the police discovered several guns.251  The 
 
238 Id. 
239 Id. (citations omitted).  
240 668 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (Sup. Ct. 1997). 
241 Id. at 315. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 317. 
244 Id. at 318. 
245 Wasserman, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 317 (explaining that the condition of inadvertence is un-
necessary and impractical). 
246 Id. at 317. 
247 749 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 2001). 
248 Id. at 172. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 173. 
251 Id. 
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court explained that the legal presence of the police to physically 
view and seize the evidence in question was critical to its determina-
tion of whether the search could be upheld under the plain view doc-
trine.252 
The court further emphasized that the warrant is what defines 
“the permissible scope and intensity of the search.”253  There are two 
conditions that the court sets out that must be satisfied for this kind of 
seizure to be lawful.254  These conditions include: “(i) f[inding] the 
item in a place where one reasonably would have expected to look 
while searching for an object particularly described and (ii) f[inding] 
it before they found all the objects described in the valid portion of 
the warrant.”255  In turn, the court determined that the seizure of the 
guns was lawful because the police sufficiently proved the two condi-
tions required in meeting their burden of introducing this kind of 
plain view evidence.256 
In People v. Batista,257 the plain view doctrine was again ex-
plored and further clarified.258  In Batista, the police got a search war-
rant for an apartment, which they suspected was being utilized for the 
possession, packaging, and selling of cocaine and crack-cocaine.259  
During the search, the doorbell for the apartment rang.260  The police 
permitted the person to enter into the apartment, but did not notify 
him of their presence.261  When the person entered into the apartment, 
the police sprung out and ordered him to put his hands up.262  As a re-
sult of his arms being raised, a brown paper bag fell to the floor.263  
The officer immediately concluded it contained narcotics.264  The of-
ficer then opened the bag and discovered cocaine.265 
When the seizure of the drugs obtained in the course of the 
search was challenged, the court reviewed the facts surrounding the 
 




256 Id. at 178. 
257 690 N.Y.S.2d 536 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999). 
258 Id. at 538. 
259 Id. at 537. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Batista, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 537. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 538. 
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search and seizure by analyzing the three conditions to the plain view 
exception.266  In turn, the court concluded that the first two require-
ments were satisfied; however, the third condition begged for a more 
scrutinized analysis.267  To determine whether the incriminating na-
ture of the package was immediately apparent, the court established a 
standard setting forth that probable cause is required in associating 
the property with criminal activity.268  Probable cause existed because 
the police were in an area lawfully sanctioned by a warrant, and 
while in that area, were conducting a search for drugs.269  Therefore, 
the search and seizure of the bag was reasonable because probable 
cause existed.270 
In People v. Johnson,271 while lawfully investigating a radio 
report regarding an assault, an arresting officer noticed, in plain view, 
the handle of a gun in the back of the defendant’s double-parked 
car.272  The court first acknowledged that the invocation of the plain 
view exception was not precluded, merely because the officer admit-
ted that he was initially unsure of what the black object was.273  The 
court reiterated that near certainty is not required to invoke the plain 
view doctrine, but rather if the circumstances of the case would lead a 
person of reasonable caution to believe that the item may be contra-
band.274  As part of the officer’s testimony, he stated that the defend-
ant spoke of “want[ing] . . . vengeance” on certain people.275  In turn, 
this observation was sufficient to find that the officer acted with 
probable cause to seize the weapon, even though he was not entirely 
sure of what the object truly was.276  There was also sufficient evi-
dence provided that a “factfinder could infer that [the] defendant ex-
ercised dominion and control over the gun that was found behind the 
driver’s seat of his nearby car.”277  Therefore, the court properly de-
 
266 Id. 




271 802 N.Y.S.2d 830 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2005). 




276 Johnson, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 831. 
277 Id. (citations omitted). 
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nied the defendant’s motion to suppress.278 
In People v. Ballard,279 the defendant was charged and con-
victed with the criminal sale of a controlled substance.280  The court 
resolved the first issue of when handcuffs were placed on the defend-
ant.281  In reviewing the record, the court found it sufficient to support 
a finding that the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant.282  
After the arrest was made, an officer with narcotics experience made 
a plain view observation of a bag that resembled cocaine.283  The 
court held that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of the bag, 
and that the motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied.284 
In People v. McEniry,285 the defendant appealed a conviction 
including the possession of a controlled substance and the operation 
of a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs.286  The defendant’s 
van had collided with a police car that was extended into the street.287  
After the collision, the police officer entered the van lawfully, there-
after making a plain view observation of drugs.288  The police officer 
then seized the drugs.289  The court determined that “[s]ince the of-
ficer was lawfully present in the van and inadvertently saw the drugs, 
[the drugs] were properly admitted under the plain view doctrine.”290 
In People v. Dobson,291 the defendant, a passenger in a car 
that the police pulled over, was observed to be putting something 
down his pants.292  In turn, the officer patted down the defendant for 
weapons in order to ensure his safety.293  One officer noticed a plastic 
bag sticking out of the back of the defendant’s pants.294 Through her 
experience and training, she was able to conclude that there were 
 
278 Id. 
279 869 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2008). 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 413-14. 
283 Id. at 414. 
284 Ballard, 869 N.Y.S.2d at 414. 
285 659 N.Y.S.2d 487 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997). 




290 McEniry, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 487. 
291 838 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007). 
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drugs in the bag.295  She pulled out the bag from the defendant’s 
pants, determining afterwards that it contained crack cocaine.296  The 
defendant argued, and the court agreed, that the plain view doctrine 
was not applicable under the facts of this case.297  The court ex-
plained that “[t]he plain view doctrine . . . establishes an exception to 
the requirement of a warrant not to search for an item, but to seize 
it.”298  The contents of the bag were only revealed after the officer 
pulled it out of the defendant’s pants.299  The court further noted two 
circumstances, which would have otherwise justified the invocation 
of the plain view doctrine.300  First, the court stated, “[T]he plastic 
bag, by its very nature, could not support any reasonable expectation 
of privacy because its content [being illegal contraband] could be in-
ferred from its outward appearance.”301  Second, the court stated, 
“[I]f the distinctive configuration of the bag proclaimed its con-
tents[,]” such a circumstance would likewise justify the court to apply 
the plain view doctrine.302  Neither of these two circumstances was 
found in this case, therefore the lower court ruling to suppress the ev-
idence was affirmed.303 
B. The Ongoing Crime Scene Rule and Preliminary 
Investigation Concept 
The courts have also discussed and analyzed other exceptions 
to the warrant requirement, and although recognized in limited cir-
cumstances notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court rejec-
tion of the doctrine, the ongoing crime scene rule remains valid in 
New York state courts to justify a warrantless search.  The concept of 
preliminary investigation is in a symbiotic union with the ongoing 
crime scene rule and the two are often inseparable. 
In People v. Cohen,304 Doctor Cohen was found in his con-
 
295 Id. 
296 Dobson, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. (quoting Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 301) (emphasis in original). 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Dobson, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 129-30. 
304 450 N.Y.S.2d 497 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1982). 
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dominium with gunshot wounds.305  The defendant told the police 
that Doctor Cohen had shot himself, but after investigating the crime 
scene and processing its findings, the medical examiner’s office told 
the police that a homicide was the more likely result of Doctor Co-
hen’s death.306  After the last police officer left the scene at 3:00 a.m., 
the crime scene remained unoccupied by the police.307  Once the po-
lice were notified of a possible homicide, they conducted a warrant-
less search of the condominium and found incriminating evidence.308  
The police did not obtain a warrant or even make an effort to do so.309  
The court subsequently suppressed the evidence, holding that the po-
lice can conduct a preliminary investigation on the premises that is 
the crime scene, but this initial investigation is “limited by and rea-
sonably related to the exigencies of the situation.”310 
In Neulist, David Lucas reported that he had found his mother 
dead in her bedroom.311  The police arrived at the crime scene and 
began their preliminary investigation.312  Based on the circumstances 
and evidence present, the police were led to believe that the mother 
died of natural causes, specifically, an aneurysm.313  Several hours 
later, an autopsy revealed a bullet in the mother’s head, and the same 
officers returned to the scene to conduct a search.314  When the initial 
responding officers were away from the crime scene, one police of-
ficer guarded the crime scene while other officer’s secured the bed-
room in which the body was found.315  Upon returning to the scene, 
the officers who were a part of the preliminary investigation complet-
ed their search and found incriminating evidence.316  The court found 
the search and seizure lawful based on the fact that there had been a 
police officer guarding the scene, “thereby establishing a continuing 
police presence on the scene.”317 
 
305 Id. at 498. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. (noting that although there were officers outside the apartment on patrol, such pres-
ence was insufficient to safeguard the crime scene). 
308 Id. 
309 Cohen, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 498. 
310 Id. at 501. 
311 Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 180. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 181. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 Neulist, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 181. 
317 Id. at 184-85. 
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In Dancey, the defendant reported to the police that she had 
been locked out of her apartment and that her baby was locked in-
side.318  She claimed that the defendant’s husband put the baby into a 
plastic bag.319  After the police broke into the apartment, they found 
the baby.320  The baby was taken to the hospital, but was pronounced 
dead soon thereafter.321  While the defendant was in the precinct, she 
admitted to putting the baby in the plastic bag.322  During the interval 
of time between when the baby was brought to the hospital and the 
defendant was at the precinct, an officer guarded the crime scene at 
the apartment.323  As this officer guarded the scene, a detective en-
tered the apartment to get a better view of the crime scene.324  How-
ever, in plain view, the detective saw incriminating evidence, and 
seized it.325  This seizure was upheld in court because of the ongoing 
police presence, the lawful presence of the detective at the crime sce-
ne, and the incriminating items being found in plain view.326 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The court in Tashbaeva addressed a question of first impres-
sion—whether subsequent to a plain view observation, an officer may 
leave the scene of a crime and return at a later time to seize the evi-
dence previously observed.  Notwithstanding some minor differences 
in the manner in which the exceptions to the warrant clause discussed 
herein are interpreted and applied, the protections afforded in the 
context of search and seizure jurisprudence at both the state and fed-
eral level are consistent.  However, as the states maintain an inherent 
police power to create new law and enforce historical guarantees such 
as the protection individuals maintain against unreasonable searches 
and seizures to the degree necessary to safeguard its citizenry, the 
trend among New York State courts is to afford more privacy rights 
than those recognized among the federal courts.  Yet all courts, at 
both the state and federal level, adhere to the view that warrantless 
 





323 Dancey, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 777. 
324 Id. at 777-78. 
325 Id. at 778. 
326 Id. 
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searches, as that conducted in Tashbaeva, are per se unreasonable.  
Therefore, unless the prosecution presents a case so as to justify in-
vocation of an exception to the warrant clause, courts will suppress 
the fruits of an unlawful search in order to uphold those guarantees 
that the Fourth Amendment mandates. 
The court in Tashbaeva did as any court must in reviewing an 
issue of first impression, considering any and all plausibly relevant 
doctrines in light of the distinct set of facts before it.  While the facts 
in the case law explored herein may only differ slightly, including, 
inter alia, by the scope and duration of the search conducted and/or 
by the interim of time that passed from the preliminary investigation 
until the subsequent search and seizure, the divergent holdings in 
each case demonstrate that close scrutiny of these variables is impera-
tive to limit the authority of law enforcement and preserve the right to 
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